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Abstract
Web attacks, i.e. attacks exclusively using the HTTP protocol, are
rapidly becoming one of the fundamental threats for information systems
connected to the Internet. When the attacks suffered by web servers
through the years are analyzed, it is observed that most of them are very
similar, using a reduced number of attacking techniques. It is generally
agreed that classification can help designers and programmers to better
understand attacks and build more secure applications. As an effort in
this direction, a new taxonomy of web attacks is proposed in this pa-
per, with the objective of obtaining a practically useful reference frame-
work for security applications. The use of the taxonomy is illustrated by
means of multiplatform real world web attack examples. Along with this
taxonomy, important features of each attack category are discussed. A
suitable semantic-dependent web attack encoding scheme is defined that
uses different-length vectors. Possible applications are described, which
might benefit from this taxonomy and encoding scheme, such as intrusion
detection systems and application firewalls.
Keywords: web attacks, taxonomy, source encoding, intrusion detection,
application firewalls
1 Introduction
With the increasing use of Internet as a commercial channel, there is a growing
number of web sites deployed to share information, offer on-line services, sell
all sorts of goods, digital or physical, distribute news and articles, etc. On
the other hand, the number of attacks is increasing in parallel: theft of private
information, defacing of homepages, denial of service, worm spreading, and
fraud, are but a few of the most common and frequent attacks in cyberspace
[16, 21].
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When the attacks suffered by web servers through the years are analyzed, it
is observed that most of them are recurrent attacks. In fact, they correspond to a
limited number of types of attacks. Thus, it is generally agreed that classification
can help designers and programmers to better understand attacks and build
more secure applications.
In an effort to create a common reference language for security analysts, a
number of classifications and taxonomies of computer attacks and vulnerabilities
have appeared in recent years [4, 10, 13, 15, 20, 22, 25, 32]. However, these
taxonomies are general and do not specifically cover web attacks.
In this paper we propose a taxonomy of web attacks, taken into account a
number of important features of each attack category. The role of these features
as well as their importance for each of the attack categories is discussed. By
web attacks, we understand attacks exclusively using the HTTP protocol.
The proposed taxonomy represents an effort to cover known attacks and
also some attacks that might appear in the future. Once the taxonomy has
been defined and the role and importance of its categories have been explained,
we use different-length vectors to encode all relevant information contained in
web attacks. These vectors can be useful in a number of applications, such as
intrusion detection systems (see Sec. 5.1) or application firewalls (see Sec. 5.2).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 proposes the taxonomy of web
attacks. Section 3 explains how and why to encode the attacks into different-
length vectors. Section 4 gives some examples of attacks encodings. Section 5
provides some ideas about which applications might benefit from this encoding
and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Web attack properties
A taxonomy is a classification scheme that partitions a body of knowledge and
defines the relationship of the objects. Classification is the process of using
a taxonomy for separating and ordering [10]. According to [2], satisfactory
taxonomies have classification categories with the following characteristics:
1. Mutually exclusive: the categories do not overlap.
2. Exhaustive: taken together, the categories include all the possibilities.
3. Unambiguous: clear and precise so that classification is not uncertain,
regardless of who is classifying.
4. Repeatable: repeated applications result in the same classification, regard-
less of who is classifying.
5. Accepted: logical and intuitive so that categories could become generally
approved.
6. Useful: could be used to gain insight into the field of inquiry.
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Figure 1: Taxonomy of web attacks.
First, we introduce a novel model of web attacks based on the concept of
attack life cycle. By attack life cycle we understand a succession of steps fol-
lowed by an attacker to carry out some malicious activity on the web server, as
depicted in Figure 1. The attacker gets through an entry point, searching for a
vulnerability in the web server or web application which causes a threat to the
web server’s assets. The vulnerability is exploited (and the threat realized) by
an action, using an HTTP element of certain length, directed against a given
target and with a given scope. The attacker might obtain some privileges that
depend on the type of attack. Our taxonomy of web attacks is based on the
attack life cycle defined in this way.
At every stage of the life cycle we define the following classification criteria
or classifiers:
1. Entry point: where the attack gets through.
2. Vulnerability: a weakness in a system allowing unauthorized action.
3. Threat: risk against vulnerable assets.
4. Action: actual attack realizing the threat against the web server caused
by the vulnerability.
5. Length: the length of the arguments passed to the HTTP request.
6. HTTP element: Verbs and headers needed to perform the attack.
7. Target: the aim of the attack.
8. Scope: impact of the attack on the web server.
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9. Privileges: privileges obtained by the attacker after the successful com-
pletion of the attack.
In the next subsections each of these criteria are covered in detail and their
relevance explained.
2.1 Entry point
The fact that a web application is successfully attacked usually means that
there is a vulnerability causing a threat that is exploited by the attacker. This
vulnerability might be found in the web server software or in the web application
code itself. Thus, according to the entry point of the attack, we distinguish
between web server software attacks and web application attacks.
2.1.1 Web server software attacks
All web server software, regardless of platform or manufacturer, unintentionally
hides a number of vulnerabilities which allow the application to be used in a
different way than intended. Many of these vulnerabilities are disclosed to the
public, for example publishing in security forums and bulletins. Upon notifica-
tion of the vulnerability, the manufacturer usually releases a patch or service
pack which should correct the error. In the meantime, since the patch is re-
leased until all servers are correctly patched, an opportunity window to exploit
the current vulnerability might exist.
2.1.2 Web application attacks
Web application-level attacks refer to the vulnerabilities inherent in the code of
a web application itself, regardless of the technology in which it is implemented
or the security of the web server/back end database on which it is built [23].
The origin of these vulnerabilities are errors in HTML forms, client-side
scripts, server-side scripts (.asp, .jsp, .php, .pl, etc.), business logic objects
(COM, COM+, CORBA, etc.), SQL sentences processing, etc.
2.2 Vulnerability
In order to reach the desired result, an attacker must take advantage of a com-
puter or network vulnerability. A vulnerability is a weakness in a system allowing
unauthorized action. We define the following vulnerabilities in web applications.
2.2.1 Code Injection
Code injection vulnerabilities allow for injecting arbitrary user-chosen code into
a page. The main categories of code injection are:
• Script injection: Outside or third-party input data received by a web ap-
plication result in a client-side script executing within the users web en-
vironment, achieving the same level of access and privileges as the hosted
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domain [32]. Cross-Site Scripting is the most common form of script in-
jection.
• SQL injection: An attacker creates or alters existing SQL commands to
gain access to unintended data or even the ability to execute system level
commands on the host. See for example [3].
• XPath injection: XPath is a language for addressing parts of an XML
document. An attacker can modify search strings to access unauthorized
data in XML documents.
These vulnerabilities arise from nonexistent or poorly designed input vali-
dation routines on the server-side.
2.2.2 Canonicalization
Canonicalization vulnerabilities occur when an application makes a security
decision based on a name (a filename, a folder name, a web address), without
having in mind the fact that the name may be expressed in more than one way
[11].
The most common way of exploiting canonicalization issues is in the form
of path traversal attacks, which allow a malicious user to execute commands
or view data outside of the intended target path. Path traversal vulnerabilities
arise normally from unchecked URL input parameters, cookies, and HTTP re-
quest headers. In most cases, a path traversal attack inherits the permissions of
the application being executed which may then access any file allowable using
those permissions.
2.2.3 HTML manipulation
HTML manipulation is a vulnerability which allows a malicious user to modify
data sent between the client (web browser) and server (web application), to
which the user was not intended to have direct access. Parameter manipulation
is often accomplished through:
• URL Query Strings
• Form Fields
• Cookies
Parameter manipulation can be prevented with good input validation tech-
niques on the server side, although it is neglected too often.
2.2.4 Overflows
Buffer overflows have been causing serious security problems for decades [5]. The
main cause of buffer overflow problems is that in some programming languages,
such as for example C/C++, there are no bounds checks on array and pointer
5
references, meaning a developer has to check the bounds, an activity that is
often ignored. When a program writes past the bounds of a buffer, this is called
a buffer overflow. Reading or writing past the end of a buffer can cause a number
of diverse behaviors: programs can act in strange ways or fail completely.
At best, a buffer overflow can stop a server or service where it happens. At
worst, it can allow for arbitrary code execution with the same privileges as the
program where it is present.
2.2.5 Misconfiguration
Sometimes, when a web server is started using the default configuration, it runs
with a number of potentially dangerous directories, sample applications, user
accounts, and other similar elements. Many vulnerabilities have been discovered
and exploited in these elements over time. It is highly advisable to uninstall or
disable everything which is not explicitly used by the web application.
Moreover, if the platform and web server are not correctly configured (care-
fully assigning file permissions, using non-default paths, etc.) many other vul-
nerabilities can arise.
2.3 Threat
There is a widely accepted set of services or requisites that all systems must
satisfy in order to be considered secure [9, 19, 25]. These services include au-
thentication, confidentiality, integrity, availability, access control, and auditing.
According to the security property under threat, we distinguish between the
following attacks.
2.3.1 Authentication
The goal of authentication is to determine whether someone or something is,
in fact, who or what it is declared to be. Authentication is commonly per-
formed through the use of passwords. Knowledge of the password is assumed
to guarantee that the user is authentic.
In a Web context, authentication attacks bypass identification controls by
using a number of different techniques, such as session hijacking, session replay,
identity spoofing, valid credentials theft, authentication module subversion, and
brute-forcing. As a consequence, an illegitimate user will be identified as a
legitimate one.
2.3.2 Authorization
The goal of authorization is to permit authenticated users to do or have some-
thing. In multi-user computer systems, a system administrator defines for the
system which users are allowed access to the system and what privileges of use
(such as access to which file directories, hours of access, amount of allocated
storage space, and so forth).
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Most common authorization attacks bypass access control by means of buffer
overflows (see Sec. 2.2.4), server platform errors, and SQL injection techniques
(see Sec. 2.2.1). Their goal is to execute database or operating system com-
mands and access resources not allowed to the unprivileged user. Eventually,
a well-implemented privilege escalation attack will result in the unauthorized
increase in the domain of access, even ensuring the attacker administrator or
root privileges.
2.3.3 Confidentiality
The goal of confidentiality is to protect the information from being disclosed or
revealed to entities not authorized to have that information.
Confidentiality attacks show private information contained in files (source
code, other users’ information, etc.), or in database tables (credit card num-
bers, personal information, etc.). Depending on the nature of the information
disclosed, the attacker can penetrate further into the attacked system or get
private information about the targeted company or its customers.
2.3.4 Integrity
Data integrity services act as safeguards against accidental or malicious tamper-
ing or modification of data. Changing the value of a data item includes inserting
additional data or deleting, modifying, or reordering parts of the existing data.
Common attacks against data integrity include database records manipula-
tion, cookie poisoning, web page alteration (defacing), and forms field modifi-
cation.
2.3.5 Availability
The goal of service availability is to ensure that users are not unduly denied
access to information and resources.
Denial of service (DoS) is the most frequent attack against availability (see
Sec. 2.4.8). DoS attacks can be conducted against the machine hosting the
web server or against the web server itself. In the first case, the attack will
use techniques equally valid for all machines connected to the Internet. In the
second case, the attack will exploit vulnerabilities in the web server or the web
application to stop normal service.
2.3.6 Auditing
The auditing services provide the system administrator with the means to record
security-relevant information, which can be analyzed to detect potential and
actual violations of the system security policy. Auditing, or accountability,
has three functions: event detection, information collection, and information
processing.
Some attacks manage to pass undetected by preventing their being logged
by the auditing system.
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2.4 Action
Most real-world attacks suffered by web servers are variants or concatenations
of a few basic actions or attack classes. In this section we try to reference those
primary attack classes which account for mostly all everyday attacks.
We distinguish among actions aimed at three different objectives: server
data, user authentication, and web server. Actions directed against data include
read, modify, delete, and fabricate. Actions directed against authentication in-
clude impersonate, bypass, and search. Actions directed against the web server
include interrupt, probe, and unknown.
2.4.1 Read
Read is an action to obtain the content of the data contained within a file,
database record, or other data medium stored in the web server. Reading does
not alter the integrity of the data read. Examples include viewing source code
files, and illicitly copying database tables.
2.4.2 Modify
Modify is an action to alter data. We limit our definition to tampering with data
on the server side. Examples include changing a database record, or changing
the contents of a file. Modifying data on the client side, such as the value of
the URL, a cookie, or a hidden field in a form, does not fall under this category
because the vast majority of web attacks imply this manipulation in some way
or another. The data continue to be available, but in altered form.
2.4.3 Delete
Delete is an action to remove or render an asset in the server irretrievable by
other legitimate users. Examples include deleting database objects and server
files.
2.4.4 Fabricate
Fabricate is an action to insert counterfeit objects into the system. Examples in-
clude adding hacker toolkits to the server filesystem, creating new user accounts,
or inserting records into a database table.
2.4.5 Impersonate
Impersonate is an action to masquerade an illegal user as a legitimate one.
Examples include authentication tickets reuse or theft.
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2.4.6 Bypass
Bypass is an action to avoid a process by using an alternative method to access
a target. Examples include directly accessing protected web resources, such as
multimedia files, by simply following a link.
2.4.7 Search
Search is an action to find valid user authentication information. Examples
include brute-force attacks which try different combinations of login/password
pairs, or repeatedly forging possible authentication tickets or session ID’s to
simulate an already validated user.
2.4.8 Interrupt
Interrupt is an action to cause networked computers to disconnect from the
network or just outright crash. Interruption of service attacks are popularly
known as denial of service (DoS) attacks. Their primary goal is to deny the
legitimate users access to a particular resource or service.
2.4.9 Probe
Probe is an action used to determine the characteristics of a specific target.
Attackers usually begin by gathering information about the target, before step-
ping into more invasive activities. For instance, the use of uncommon HTTP
headers, such as HEAD, or web site mirroring tools, such as Teleport Pro [33]
or wget [34], are indicators that an attack might be under way. More aggressive
tools, such as Whisker [35] or Nikto [31] are more than probing tools, since they
scan the web server in search of vulnerabilities.
2.4.10 Unknown
When an attacker executes code, but it is impossible to ascertain what the
command executed is, we consider the action carried as unknown. Examples
include a buffer overflow with a command execution payload or .bat or .cmd
files executed via URL name. Usually, these unknown actions are considered a
threat against authorization, because although the outcome of such execution
cannot be known, we assume it is unauthorized.
2.5 Length
Buffer overflows are the most common form of security vulnerability today,
not only in web applications but also in all Internet applications and services.
They are the easiest to exploit with the most devastating consequences, usually
resulting in complete takeover of the attacked host.
Buffer overflows often need a very long data input to work. Hence, based
on the length of the attack string, we distinguish between common-length and
unusually long attacks.
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2.5.1 Common length
Attacks which are not based on exploiting a buffer overflow seldom submit ar-
guments of a length greater than a certain threshold that can be experimentally
defined for a particular web server. Thus, most attacks fall under this category.
2.5.2 Unusually long
Buffer overflows require passing arguments of sufficient length to fill a memory
buffer allocated to a particular input, along with some additional data that
are written into memory outside the buffer. When these additional data are
missing, the buffer overflow usually results in a Denial of Service (DoS) attack
(see Sec. 2.4.8), whereas when it is present and accurately crafted, might result
in a system command execution.
Unexpectedly long input arguments very likely imply a buffer overflow attack
attempt.
2.6 HTTP element
As a prerequisite of our definition of web attacks, the HTTP protocol must
be used in order to carry out attacks against web servers. An HTTP request
consists of a verb and a group of headers. Different attacks use different verbs
and/or headers. It is obvious that this category is not mutually exclusive, but
actually is unambiguous and we consider it valid to be included in our global
taxonomy, since it provides useful information. Thus, according to the HTTP
element used, we distinguish the following attacks.
2.6.1 GET/POST
Most common HTTP requests (and attacks) use the GET or POST verbs.
2.6.2 Host
Most common HTTP requests use the Host header which represents the naming
authority of the origin server or gateway given by the original URL.
2.6.3 Cookie
Most web applications use cookies to improve the user experience. When a web
browser requests a page from a server, it routinely sends the cookies it received
from that domain. These cookies are sent by means of the Cookie header.
Cookies can be tampered with manually, changing their value.
2.6.4 Referer
The Referer[sic] header field allows the client to specify the address (URI) of
the resource from which the Request URI was obtained. Although the browser
must fill this header, manual manipulation of this field cannot be prevented.
10
2.6.5 Translate
”Translate: f” is a header used by WebDAV. Adding this to HTTP GET signals
WebDAV components to really return source code of files and bypass processing.
It is used in FrontPage 2000 and any WebDAV compatible client to get files for
editing. It has to be accompanied by some other information which should not
let anyone access the sources.
2.6.6 SEARCH
As a part of the extra functionality provided by the WebDAV components,
Microsoft has introduced the SEARCH request verb to enable searching for files
based upon certain criteria.
2.6.7 PROPFIND
The WebDAV PROPFIND verb retrieves properties for a resource identified
by the request URI. The PROPFIND method can be used on collection and
property resources.
2.7 Target
Not all web attacks aim at the same target. Some attackers might be interested
in taking control over the web server machine and extending their attack further
into the server’s network. Others might be interested only in obtaining database
records, modifying some pages or misleading other users. Based on the target
of the attack, we distinguish between application and platform attacks.
2.7.1 Web application
Web application attacks are directed against the web application running on
top of the server platform. If the attack succeeds, only the application data and
functionality will be affected, but not the operating system resources. These
attacks are typically aimed at web pages (obtaining and/or modifying source
code) and database records (viewing, changing and/or deleting information).
2.7.2 Platform
Under this attack, the target is beyond the web application, aimed at the plat-
form. The attacker usually seeks after arbitrary command execution, manipula-
tion of machine accounts, tampering with the host’s services, obtaining network
information, etc. The web server is used as a mere portal to gain access to the
internal network.
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2.8 Scope
Different attacks affect the web server in different ways. Many attacks only
affect one user or a group of users, whereas others have an impact on all users
of the service.
Regarding the scope of the attack, we can distinguish between local and
universal attacks.
2.8.1 Local
In these attacks, only one user or a small group of users is affected. If the
individual attack can be automated and extended to any other user, then it
pertains to the category of universal attacks. An example are data harvesting
attacks.
2.8.2 Universal
All users will be affected by the attack. Typically, universal attacks include web
defacing, database record manipulation, and code injection.
2.9 Privileges
When an attacker compromises a web server, the ultimate goal is to gain admin-
istrator/root privileges. Most web attacks do not allow the attacker to escalate
privileges. They run under a restricted account in the server or database. How-
ever, misconfiguration of the operating system access control lists, web server
permissions, and database users could enable an attacker to reach administrative
privileges. There are three categories of users involved in an attack:
• The web application user.
• The database user.
• The operating system level user.
Hence, with regard to the privilege obtained by the attack, we can distin-
guish between unprivileged and administrative attacks. This category is only
applicable when the objective of the attack is obtaining access as a certain user,
i.e., authentication attacks (see Sec. 2.3.1).
2.9.1 Unprivileged user
Attacks are run under the identity of a web user, a database user, and/or a
system-level user. The attacker can access resources only accessible to that user
and thus the impact of the attack is limited.
2.9.2 Administrator/root
If the attacker succeeds in gaining administrative access, the machine is com-
pletely compromised. This is the highest level of attack realization.
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3 Encoding of the attacks
Now that we have already characterized attacks by their fundamental properties,
we face the problem of how to encode the attack information in a compact and
useful way. Provided that the number of attacks suffered by a web site with
medium traffic can grow very quickly, it is not advisable to record unnecessary
information to prevent running out of storage space prematurely. In fact, the
main goal of this taxonomy is to capture the relevant information about attacks,
allowing to perform an analysis in order to decide on the severity of the attack.
To reduce the amount of the information recorded on the media, the data
can be compressed, using some of the source coding techniques. But the use
of general compression techniques and algorithms in this case has serious draw-
backs. These drawbacks depend on the class of the method. Here we enumerate
some of them.
For static defined word schemes to be implemented (e.g. [1], [6], [8], [12],
[24] ) the knowledge of the probabilities of message classes is needed in advance.
The problem is that if we treat the descriptions of the attacks as messages, the
probability of their appearance varies with time, as new attacks are invented
and the remedies are published. Other definitions of messages in this case would
be too general and would not lead to a sufficient compression ratio.
To adapt to the changes of the message probabilities, the adaptive Huffman
coding can be used (e.g. the FGK algorithm [7] or the Vitter algorithm [27]).
But there is no guarantee that the compression ratio achieved by these meth-
ods is satisfactory, since these encodings are often outperformed by the static
methods [27].
The main drawback of the free-parse methods, such as Ziv-Lempel [28] is
that they perform very badly when short messages are encoded. As in the case
of the static word schemes, other definitions of messages would not lead to an
efficient compression.
Having in mind the specific type of local redundancy in the descriptions of
the attacks (i.e. the descriptions of some of the attacks include some of the
attack properties, whereas the descriptions of the others do not), we propose a
semantic dependent data compression method that makes use of different-length
vectors. The vectors have different lengths because only the information signifi-
cant to the particular attack is retained. Besides its advantage over the general
data compression schemes considering the efficiency of the short messages en-
coding, the use of this type of semantic dependent encoding makes possible the
direct use of classification and clustering techniques that are often needed in
the implementations, since the classification and clustering can be performed
without decompressing [18].
To encode the descriptions of the attacks using the semantic dependent
method introduced above, a range of positive integers is assigned to each of
the attack properties discussed, in the following way.
1. Entry point (1 bit of information)
0 - Web server software (ISAPI filters, Perl modules, etc.)
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1 - Web application (HTML, server-side and client-side scripts, server
components, SQL sentences, etc.)
2. Vulnerability (3 bits of information)
0 - Code Injection (SQL, JScript, cross-site scripting, etc.)
1 - Canonicalization
2 - HTML manipulation
3 - Overflows
4 - Misconfiguration (default directories, sample applications, guest ac-
counts, etc.)
X - Not applicable
3. Threat (3 bits of information)
0 - Authentication
1 - Authorization
2 - Confidentiality
3 - Integrity
4 - Availability
5 - Auditing
4. Action (4 bits of information)
0 - Read
1 - Modify
2 - Delete
3 - Fabricate
4 - Impersonate
5 - Bypass
6 - Search
7 - Interrupt
8 - Probe
9 - Unknown
5. Length (1 bit of information)
0 - Expected
1 - Unexpected (unusually long)
X - Not applicable
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6. HTTP element (7 bits of information)
01 - GET/POST
02 - HOST
04 - COOKIE
08 - REFERER
10 - TRANSLATE
20 - SEARCH
40 - PROPFIND
7. Target (1 bit of information)
0 - Web application (source files, customers’ data, etc.)
1 - Platform (OS command execution, system accounts, network, etc.)
8. Scope (1 bit of information)
0 - Local (one user affected)
1 - Universal (all users affected)
X - Not applicable
9. Privileges (1 bit of information)
0 - Unprivileged user
1 - Administrator/root
X - Not applicable
Each property requires a certain number of bits to encode its information.
When only one bit is required, it means that the property can take one of
two possible values, but not both. However, when the property can take some
different values simultaneously, as many bits as the number of possible values
are required.
4 Encoding examples
Let us consider the following common attacks directed against different types of
web servers and platforms. When applicable, all references refer to the Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), a list of standardized names for vulnera-
bilities and other information security exposures [30]. The vectors corresponding
to the attacks are encoded in hexadecimal.
1. GET /ows-bin/*.bat?&\\attacker\getadmin.bat
Batch files in the Oracle web listener for NT ows-bin directory allow remote
attackers to execute commands via a malformed URL that includes “?&”.
Vector: {0, X, 1, 9, 0, 01, 1, X, 0}
Reference: CVE-2000-0169
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2. GET /servlet//..//../o.jsp
Directory traversal vulnerability in Oracle JSP 1.0.x through 1.1.1 and
Oracle 8.1.7 iAS Release 1.0.2 can allow a remote attacker to read or
execute arbitrary .jsp files via a ‘..’ (dot dot) attack.
Vector: {0, 1, 2, 0, 0, 01, 0, X, X}
Reference: CVE-2001-0591
3. GET /test.jsp?[buffer]
Buffer overflow in BEA WebLogic server proxy plugin allows remote at-
tackers to execute arbitrary commands via a long URL with a .JSP ex-
tension.
Vector: {0, 3, 1, 9, 1, 01, 1, X, X}
Reference: CVE-2000-0681
4. GET /ConsoleHelp/login.jsp
BEA WebLogic 5.1.x allows remote attackers to read source code for
parsed pages by inserting /ConsoleHelp/ into the URL, which invokes
the FileServlet.
Vector: {0, X, 2, 0, 0, 01, 0, X, X}
Reference: CVE-2000-0682
5. GET / HTTP/1.0
Host: /
split-logfile in Apache 1.3.20 allows remote attackers to overwrite arbitrary
files that end in the .log extension via an HTTP request with a / (slash)
in the Host: header.
Vector: {0, X, 3, 1, 0, 03, 1, X, X}
Reference: CVE-2001-0730
6. GET [non-protected resource][special request]
PHP Apache module 4.0.4 and earlier allows remote attackers to bypass
.htaccess access restrictions via a malformed HTTP request on an unre-
stricted page that causes PHP to use those access controls on the next
page that is requested.
Vector: {0, X, 0, 5, 0, 01, 0, X, 0}
Reference: CVE-2001-0108
7. GET [bufer].shtml
Buffer overflow in the SHTML logging functionality of iPlanet Web Server
4.x allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a long
filename with a .shtml extension.
Vector: {0, 3, 1, 9, 1, 01, 1, X, X}
Reference: CVE-2000-1077
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8. GET /ca/\../\../\../\file.ext
Directory traversal vulnerability in iPlanet Certificate Management Sys-
tem 4.2 and Directory Server 4.12 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary
files via a .. (dot dot) attack in the Agent, End Entity, or Administrator
services.
Vector: {0, 1, 2, 0, 0, 01, 0, X, X}
Reference: CVE-2000-1075
9. GET /default.ida?[Ax240]=x
Buffer overflow in ISAPI extension (idq.dll) in Index Server 2.0 and In-
dexing Service 2000 in IIS 6.0 beta and earlier allows remote attackers to
execute arbitrary commands via a long argument to Internet Data Admin-
istration (.ida) and Internet Data Query (.idq) files such as default.ida, as
commonly exploited by Code Red [26].
Vector: {0, 3, 4, 7, 1, 01, 0, 1, X}
Reference: CVE-2001-0500
10. GET /login.aspx?username=fred\&password=aaaaa\&mode=Enter
GET /login.aspx?username=fred\&password=aaaab\&mode=Enter
GET /login.aspx?username=fred\&password=aaaac\&mode=Enter
GET /login.aspx?username=fred\&password=aaaad\&mode=Enter
The absence of validation of the number of login retries allows remote
attackers to try different combinations of the password several thousand
times to crack the password.
Vector: {1, X, 0, 6, 0, 01, 0, 0, 0}
11. GET /pub/product.pl?id=1; DROP TABLE Products --
Poor input validation allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary SQL com-
mands.
Vector: {1, 0, 3, 2, 0, 01, 0, 1, X}
12. GET /scripts/..%255c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:\
IIS 4.0 and 5.0 allows remote attackers to read documents outside of the
web root, and possibly execute arbitrary commands, via malformed URLs
that contain UNICODE encoded characters, also known as the “Web
Server Folder Traversal” vulnerability.
Vector: {0, 1, 2, 0, 0, 01, 1, X, 0}
Reference: CVE-2000-0884
13. POST /pub/login.cgi
login=’+or+’’=’\&password=’+or+’’=’\&Mode=Enter
Poor input validation allows remote attackers to tamper with SQL sen-
tences to authenticate successfully without having a valid user account.
Vector: {1, 0, 0, 4, 0, 01, 0, 0, 0}
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14. GET /global.asa\%3f+.htr
IIS 5.0 and 4.0 allows remote attackers to read the source code for exe-
cutable web server programs by appending “%3F+.htr” to the requested
URL, which causes the files to be parsed by the .HTR ISAPI extension,
also known as a variant of the “File Fragment Reading via .HTR” vulner-
ability.
Vector: {0, X, 2, 0, 0, 01, 0, X, X}
Reference: CVE-2001-0004
15. GET /members/_vti_cnf/
For every directory in a web application, FrontPage extensions create a
directory ‘ vti cnf’ which stores a copy of all files, with the extension .base
added. As a consequence, source code of these files can be viewed by a
browser. This attack checks if that directory exists.
Vector: {1, 4, 2, 0, 0, 01, 8, X, X}
16. GET /product.jsp?id=10&title=<script>alert()</script>
The page displays as title the argument to a parameter passed in the
URL. JavaScript code can be injected, opening the opportunity for a Cross
Site Scripting attack. This is simply a probe, since it does not perform
malicious activity.
Vector: {0, 0, 1, 8, 0, 01, , 0, X}
17. PROPFIND /
The default configuration of Apache 1.3.12 in SuSE Linux 6.4 enables
WebDAV, which allows remote attackers to list arbitrary diretories via
the PROPFIND HTTP request method.
Vector: {0, X, 2, 0, 0, 40, 0, X, X}
Reference: CVE-2000-0869
18. SEARCH /
long valid request
IIS 5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a series of
malformed WebDAV requests.
Vector: {0, 3, 4, 7, 20, 0, 1, X}
Reference: CVE-2001-0151
19. GET /dir/[../](repeated approx 1344 times)
iPlanet Enterprise Server 4.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of
service via a long HTTP GET request that contains many “/../” (dot dot)
sequences.
Vector: {0, 3, 4, 7, 1, 01, 0, 1, X}
Reference: CVE-2001-0252
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20. GET /prod.asp?id=1;exec xp_cmdshell’net user bob h6q2 /add’--
The web application allows SQL injection. The attacker exploits this vul-
nerability by executing a SQL Server extended procedure which executes
any command passed as argument. In this example, the attacker adds
himself to the OS users.
Vector: {1, 0, 1, 3, 0, 01, 1, X, 0}
5 Possible applications
This taxonomy and the corresponding attack encoding vectors are useful in a
number of applications, especially in intrusion detection systems and application-
level firewalls.
5.1 Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
An intrusion detection system (IDS) detects and reports attempts to break
into or misuse networked computer systems in real time [17]. A traditional,
nonheuristically based IDS consists of three functional components:
• A monitoring component, such as a packet capturer, which collects traffic
data.
• An inference component, which analyzes the captured data to determine
whether it corresponds to normal activity or malicious activity.
• An alerting component, which generates a response when an attack has
been detected. This response can be passive (such as writing an entry in
an event log) or active (such as changing configuration rules in the firewall
to block the attacker’s IP address).
Coding web attacks into different-length vectors could aid in the postpro-
cessing of IDS alerts, to decide on the severity of the detected attacks.
5.2 Application-level firewall
A major problem with IDS is that they are oblivious to SSL traffic. As a
consequence, whenever a web site supports SSL encryption, all the attacker has
to do in order to evade IDS detection is to submit all attack requests using an
SSL channel.
Another approach to web attack detection and prevention consists of using
an application-level firewall or, more specifically, web application firewalls [14].
A traditional firewall provides protection only at the network level, with minimal
or no application awareness [29]. On the other hand, application-level firewalls
are capable of processing data at the application level as well as decrypting SSL
connections. An application-layer solution works within the application that it
is protecting, inspecting requests as they come in from the network level. If at
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any point a possible attack is detected, it can take over and prevent unauthorized
access and/or damage to the web server.
Encoding web attacks into different-length vectors could help the application-
level firewall to decide about the action to be taken when an attack is detected.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, a taxonomy of web attacks is proposed that intends to represent
a forward step towards a more precise reference framework. An attack life cycle
is defined as its base, to make it structured and logical. The properties of the
most common web attacks are described. A new semantic-dependent encod-
ing scheme for these attacks is defined that uses different-length vectors. The
most important advantage of this scheme over general purpose data compression
methods is that the decompression is not needed in the applications. Real world
examples of attacks against different platforms, web servers, and applications
are given to illustrate how this taxonomy can be applied. Finally, possible ap-
plications are described, which might benefit from this taxonomy and encoding
scheme, such as intrusion detection systems and application firewalls.
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